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Abstract 
This paper presents the results of a behavioral economics study to test if the 
tax rates submitted to finance the public provision of a private good are in-
fluenced by changing the name of the private good. A revealed-preference la-
boratory decision-making experiment is used to test if participants choose 
significantly different tax rates to support provision of a private good named 
as a health care investment compared to an identical good named as a neutral 
monetary investment. Although some previous studies focusing on both 
framing and context effects find differences associated with health versus 
non-health environments, these studies have not involved voting over public 
provision of a private good. In our experimental environment, participants 
with different income endowments provide their preferred proportional tax 
rates for financing public provision of a private good in either a neutral or a 
health context. The implemented tax rate is the median preferred tax rate, and 
once the budget is determined, each participant receives the same quantity of 
the publicly provided private good. In each context, the payoff functions are 
the same. The only difference between the contexts is the name attached to the 
publicly provided private good, regardless of the name attached to the publicly 
provided private good, consuming it imposes no externalities. This controls 
for the positive externality characteristics of many health care goods, but not 
for preferences evoked by the merit good character of health care which factor 
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into decisions about the public provision of health care. We find that the 
theoretical predictions of the median voter model are generally supported by 
the data. However, the conjecture that the implemented tax rate would be af-
fected by context is not supported by the results. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent papers have created environments to study mixed systems of public and 
private financing of the public provision of private goods in controlled laborato-
ry environments. The goods studied all have the characteristics of excludability 
and the absence of externalities associated with their consumption. These could 
be goods such as health care or education or services such as garbage collection. 
[1] develops a simple discrete version of a majority-rule voting model of 
tax-financed public provision of a private good. Their treatment, which only al-
lows for public financing, is extended to allow individuals to top up publicly fi-
nanced consumption with privately financed units of the good or to opt out of 
consuming the publicly financed good and purchase all of their consumption 
privately while continuing to participate in financing the public provision. [2] 
further extends this environment to allow some or all individuals to exit from 
publicly financing the private good entirely. 
The publicly financed private good in [1] was presented in a neutral monetary 
investment context. The neutral context follows an established tradition in expe-
rimental economics. However, recently there have been arguments presented 
that suggest even neutral contexts focused on questions about the effectiveness 
of the incentives created in controlled laboratory environments may result in 
some loss of experimental control. [3] and [4] discuss the need to consider the 
framing context of an experiment before drawing general conclusions because 
without that context, the experimenter is unable to control for the contexts par-
ticipants impose themselves. [5] discusses “when and why” the context of the 
controlled laboratory environment that may matter and describe three types of 
context: abstract, meaningful and evocative. If participants instinctively create 
their own context for the neutral investment environment in order to better un-
derstand the problems, and especially if different participants choose different 
contexts, it is possible that researchers may lose some control of their environ-
ments.  
In an attempt to focus on the incentives provided by publicly provided private 
goods, such as health care, researchers may unknowingly bias their results by 
using a neutral context. Because of the different, non-neutral, beliefs that the 
participants have about the value of publicly providing this private good, beha-
vior may be observed that is unpredicted and difficult to understand. This may 
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be particularly relevant if participants consider the publicly financed private 
good to be health care because the characteristics of health care often lead people 
to treat it differently from everyday consumption goods. With the exception of 
cosmetic procedures, demand for health care is derived from the demand for 
health and not health care itself. Health care is not consumed primarily for its 
direct effect on utility, but for its indirect effect on one’s health status, which is 
an essential prerequisite for most activities of daily life (see e.g., [6]). Hence, 
generally individuals consume health care only when ill or injured, and it is 
needed to improve one’s health status. These characteristics of consumption 
could therefore influence decisions about health care spending differently than 
decisions about spending on otherwise identical non-health care goods. 
The characteristics of health and health care, including the asymmetry of in-
formation about health care between health care providers and consumers of 
health care, underlie the fact that, unlike standard consumption goods, in nearly 
all developed countries of the world (including the US when tax expenditures are 
included) the majority of health care is financed through the public sector. The 
goal is typically to ensure access to health care and its allocation according to 
need. Most societies treat health care as a merit good whose consumption should 
not be left entirely to an individual’s ability and willingness to pay. If potential 
consumers of a publicly provided private good must vote on the value of the 
proportional income tax rate that will finance this provision, knowing specific 
details about the private good may be important. Individuals may have differing 
propensities to support public provision depending on whether they interpret 
the private good as say, health care, education or garbage collection. If alterna-
tive goods have identical characteristics, might the name the good is called have 
an effect on the decision that voters make? 
[2] supplemented their neutral-context treatments of exit from a system of 
publicly financed private goods with health-context treatments. However, the 
health-context treatments that were presented were focused on investigating exit 
behavior from public finance and sample sizes were small. It is difficult to know 
whether the health-context effects found in the study would translate to a man-
datory public financing environment if a larger data sample was collected. Using 
the three categories of context discussed by [5], the neutral context and health- 
care contexts investigated by [2] may be identified as “meaningful”. However, 
the health care context also has an “evocative” quality to the extent that it moti-
vates feeling with respect to the merit good character of health care that cannot 
easily be induced in the laboratory environment.  
This paper presents newly collected data expanding on the framework pre-
sented in [1] and [2] for which publicly financed private good provision is man-
datory and is funded by a proportional tax on the income of the people who will 
receive the publicly provided private good. The instructions for the laboratory 
environments are presented in two different contexts. One context identifies the 
private good as health care and the other identifies the private good simply as a 
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private investment good. The top-up, opt-out and exit options that were pre-
sented in [1] and [2] are not examined here; the focus is on systems of manda-
tory public finance. 
The value of searching for context effects in an environment involving man-
datory public finance is predicated on the observation noted above that nearly all 
countries in the developed world have some form of public health care and this 
suggests that people consider health care to be a merit good. Accordingly, creat-
ing a health context by simply using the words “health care” to describe the pri-
vate good that is publicly provided may induce behavior that differs from beha-
vior in a context which provides no indication of the nature of the private in-
vestment good other than the characteristics that are included as part of the in-
structions for the participants in a laboratory session which is identical for the 
two contexts. This is, therefore, a preliminary investigation of the minimum 
amount of context required to induce a behavioral response.  
In this paper we present data from 40 groups of five participants who are each 
asked to provide the proportional tax rate on income that they would prefer to 
see imposed on all individuals in their group in order to provide resources to 
finance the supply of an equal amount of a private good to all members of their 
group. For 20 of the 40 groups the private good is presented as the result of an 
investment of resources into a group fund to finance, for each individual in the 
group, the opportunity to consume an equal amount of a private good that in  
turn will provide an equal return to each individual in the group.1 For an addi-
tional 20 groups of five participants the publicly financed private good is pre-
sented in the same way but the private good that is available for consumption is 
labelled as a health care good.2 
To test for a context effect we focus on the implemented median tax rates in 
our two treatments. We also report the total public supply of the private good 
and the system returns across the two contexts (the former is directly related to 
the implemented tax rate and the latter is a crude measure of social welfare). 
None of the analysis presented in this paper has been reported elsewhere. We 
 
 
1The data for 10 groups in the environment using the private-good-only context were run to study 
the effect of top-up and opt-out treatments relative to public-only provision (see [1]). The data used 
are from the groups in which the public-only treatment was run before the top-up or opt-out treat-
ments. The data for another 10 groups in the environment using the private-good-only context were 
run to study the effect of universal-exit and exit-with-a-floor treatments relative to public-only pro-
vision (see [2]). The data used are from the groups in which the public-only treatment was run be-
fore the universal-exit or exit-with-a-floor treatments. 
2The data for 10 of these “health” groups were collected for [2] to evaluate the exit treatments. The 
data used are from the groups in which the public-only treatment was run before the exit treatments.  
Data were collected from 10 additional “health” groups in May 2017 to increase the sample size to 20 
groups. These data were collected for the purposes of the current study and are not presented else-
where. This number of observations was selected to assure sufficient statistical power to identify a 
difference between the tax rates in the two contexts of at least 3 percentage points. This is described 
below in detail in subsection 4.2. The good identified as a health care good in this environment pro-
vides only private benefits. There are no positive or negative externalities associated with an indi-
vidual’s consumption of the health care good. However, identifying the private good as health care 
may evoke attitudes associated with the provision of merit goods when participants make decisions 
regarding the amount of the good that they wish to have provided publicly. 
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find no significant context effects. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
We implement a standard political economy model of the public provision of a 
private good in a laboratory setting by adopting a discrete income distribution 
and a specific utility function (see [1]). There are N individuals who differ in 
their fixed income (or endowment of a numeraire consumption good) denoted 
by y. The median income in the population is ym, which is less than the mean 
income, ym. Individuals have preferences over consumption of the numeraire 
good, given by c, and of the private good that is publicly provided uniformly to 
all individuals, given by h. Individual preferences are represented by the utility 
function  
( ),U c h ac bhη η= +                         (1) 
where a, b > 0 and 0 < η < 1. The publicly financed private good is produced us-
ing the numeraire good. Following the literature, it takes one unit of the nume-
raire consumption good to produce one unit of the publicly provided private 
good. 
The publicly provided private good is financed by a proportional income tax t 
levied on all individuals’ incomes. The government’s budget constraint is 
mty h=                              (2) 
and the individual’s budget constraint is 
( )– mc y y y h=                          (3) 
Let T(y) = (y/ym) be the individual’s relative tax price for the publicly financed 
private good. Using the Equations (3) and (1) we can solve for the individual’s 
induced utility function with respect to the public provision of the private good  
( ) ( )( )maxV h a y T y h bhη η≡ − +                  (4) 
where h ≥ 0. V(h) is strictly concave in h. This results in a unique preferred tax 
rate and a unique amount of public provision of the private good for each indi-
vidual given public financing through a common proportional income tax levied 
on each individual in the group. Both the preferred amount of h and the pre-
ferred tax rate will be strictly decreasing in the individual’s income. Under ma-
jority-rule voting, the preferred tax rate of the median income individual will be 
the implemented tax rate and this individual’s preferred public provision of the  
private good will be supplied to each individual regardless of income.3 Therefore, 
we have the following theoretical predictions: 
Theoretical Prediction 1: In a public-only financing system, preferred tax 
rates are strictly decreasing in income; and  
Theoretical Prediction 2: In a public-only financing system, the preferred tax 
 
 
3The formal statements of the predicted tax rate and public provision of the private good are pre-
sented in [1] and follow directly from applying the median voter theorem. 
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rate of the median income individual will be implemented under majority-rule. 
Because the implemented tax rate is the tax rate preferred by the median in-
come individual who, by assumption has an income below the mean income lev-
el, public provision of a private good effectively redistributes income (and utility 
or payoffs) from the highest income individuals to the lowest income individu-
als. 
3. The Health Care Context 
The health context modifies only the language of the experimental instructions 
without changing the underlying decision problem and financial incentives faced 
by the participants. We are specifically interested in whether individuals make 
different decisions about their preferred tax rates to fund a publicly financed 
private good if  
1) The good is described as an equal share from the resources deposited into a 
Group Investment Fund that is then invested in a private Market which yields a 
return that is equal for everyone in the group or;  
2) The good is described as an equal share from the resources deposited into a 
Group Health Care Fund that is then deposited into a personal Health Care Ac-
count which yields a return that is equal for everyone in the group. 
In the private-good (neutral) context participants are told that the total taxes 
collected (5tym) in the Group Investment Fund are divided equally amongst eve-
ryone, so each individual receives h, which is then invested in Market A. The 
payoff to each individual from Market A is equal to bhη > h. The income not 
taken as a tax from each individual (c) is put into a Private Investment Fund that 
invests in Market B on behalf of the individual and the proceeds result in the 
payoff to the individual equal to acη > c. h is determined by (2) and c is deter-
mined by (3). 
In the health context, participants are told that the total taxes collected (5tym) 
in the Group Health Care Fund are divided equally amongst everyone, so each 
individual receives h, which is then placed into the individual’s Health Care Ac-
count. The payoff to each individual from this Health Care Account (from the 
ability to consume up to h units of health care) is equal to bhη > h. The income 
not taken as a tax from each individual is put into a Private Fund that invests in 
a Private Investment Account on behalf of the individual and the proceeds result 
in the payoff to the individual equal to acη > c. h is determined by (2) and c is 
determined by (3). 
As noted, one reason health care is said to be different from conventional 
consumer goods is that its demand is “derived” from the demand for health: 
people purchase health care not for its direct effect on utility, but to improve 
their health when they are ill or injured. We can consider the public provision of 
health care in our environment as the provision of public funding to enable par-
ticipants to purchase needed health care. It provides each participant the ability 
to access h units of health care during the period of time for which the payoff 
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function (1) is relevant. For the participant, the ability to access these units dur-
ing this specific period of time has the value bhη > h. We can consider the neu-
tral investment context in a similar way. Each participant has the ability to con-
sume h units of a private good produced in Market A with the resources in the 
investment fund during the period of time for which the payoff function (1) is 
relevant. The participant’s ability to access these units has the value bhη > h. If 
the health context evokes recognition that there is a merit component to the 
provision of the health good that does not exist for the neutral good, the result-
ing values of t * and of h* may be different in the different contexts. 
This different terminology was introduced to provide participants with a deci-
sion between an explicitly named health care option and an explicitly named 
private investment option while ensuring an identical experimenter-induced 
outcome and payoff situation for the two contexts. If the only difference between 
the two contexts is the name used to describe the publicly provided private good, 
then according to the theoretical model there should be no difference in beha-
vior. More poetically stated.  
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell 
as sweet:” [[7], p. 404, lines 43-44]. 
Considering alternative contexts for our laboratory environment leads to our 
research question. 
Question: Is there a difference in the implemented tax rate to finance the 
public provision of a private good if the good is presented as a health care good 
rather than as a generic private good? 
While our theoretical model does not predict any behavioral differences be-
tween alternative contexts for the tax rates that will be preferred by individuals, 
the question of whether a health care context effect might exist in our setting is 
an interesting one. If participants recognize that the private good identified as 
health care has comparable properties to the good identified as a conventional 
private good (no positive externalities from consumption or merit good proper-
ties), there should be no difference in the outcomes associated with each context. 
If some participants associate the health care good with a commonly held belief 
that it is a merit good, we would expect to find greater investment in health care 
goods through a higher preferred tax rate (to account for a positive return to the 
participant, above the induced return provided by the experimenter, for contri-
buting to the financing of a merit good). The literature does not provide an un-
ambiguous answer to our question. 
[8] and [9] have previously investigated health versus neutral contexts of ex-
periments, with a focus on the influence of professional norms on physician de-
cision-making regarding the provision of services. They find positive effects of 
the health frame on services provided. 
[10] studies an environment in which both public and private insurance is 
available to individuals in a laboratory environment. The private insurance 
guarantees that the insured receives compensation for a loss before anyone with 
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public insurance receives compensation. The public insurance guarantees pro-
tection for the people with public insurance who have the greatest likelihood of a 
loss given that the resources to provide compensation are available. In one 
treatment compensation is characterized as being cash to purchase health care 
for an illness. In the second treatment compensation is characterized as being 
cash for a loss. They find that when compensation from public insurance is ra-
tioned by need, individuals’ willingness-to-pay for private insurance is lower in 
the health care context than in the cash-for-a-loss context. However, when 
compensation from public insurance is rationed randomly (first-come, first 
served) there is no difference between willingness to pay for private insurance in 
the health care and generic loss contexts. 
[2] found significant effects of context on exit behavior from public finance of 
a private good when a privately financed alternative was available. They found 
that a greater percentage of people exited from public provision with the health 
context than with the neutral context. These results were more consistent with 
the theoretical prediction on exit than were the neutral context results and not 
consistent with a belief that people would recognize the merit good character of 
health care and be less likely to exit from public provision than if the good was 
framed neutrally and did not evoke this merit good characteristic. 
We do not have a theoretical model that can offer a prediction for a context 
effect in this environment. Neither do we have consistent behavioral evidence 
from other experiments to suggest a context effect for the tax rate that will be 
implemented for this environment of the public provision of a private good. The 
data from this experiment will help to identify a context effect. 
4. Parameterization and Laboratory Implementation 
4.1. Parameterization 
The payoffs to individuals were calculated using the payoff function given by 
Equation (1), where the return to the individual’s share of the Group Investment 
Fund (the Group Health Care Fund in the health context) is bhη and the return 
to the individual’s investment in Market B (the Private Investment Account) is 
acη. The parameter values and the incomes of the five participants in each group 
who shared the publicly provided private goods were those used in [1] and [2] 
and were chosen to assure the saliency of participant decisions in the experi-
ment. The parameter values for (1) are: a = 20, b = 22 and η = 0.6. The incomes 
are L$125, L$275, L$640, L$700 and L$1500. 
Based on these parameters and incomes, the theoretically predicted imple-
mented tax rate that would result from payoff maximizing decisions is 56.4%. 
The predicted total consumption of the private good is 1827 units. The predicted 
total payoff received by the five members of each group that is associated with 
this tax rate is L$6550.  
4.2. Laboratory Implementation 
Twenty computer-mediated laboratory sessions were run, each with ten partici-
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pants who were told that they would be randomly assigned to be a member of a 
group of five people, but were not told who was in their group. In total there are 
20 groups of five participants who experienced the neutral context and 20 
groups of five participants who experienced the health context for a total of 200  
participants.4 The data analyzed here are summarized by source, treatment and 
context in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Data sources, treatments, session contexts and participants. 
 Source of data Treatment for periods 1 - 10 
Treatment for  
periods 11 - 20 
Session 
context 
Number of  
participants 
(Groups) 
1 JEBO 2015 Public only Top up Neutral 25 (5) 
2 JEBO 2015 Top up Public only Neutral 25 (5) 
3 JEBO 2015 Public only Opt out Neutral 25 (5) 
4 JEBO 2015 Opt out Public only Neutral 25 (5) 
5 JEBO 2016 Public only Universal exit Neutral 25 (5) 
6 JEBO 2016 Universal exit Public only Neutral 25 (5) 
7 JEBO 2016 Public only Conditional exit Neutral 25 (5) 
8 JEBO 2016 Conditional exit Public only Neutral 25 (5) 
9 JEBO 2016 Public only Universal exit Health 25 (5) 
10 JEBO 2016 Universal exit Public only Health 25 (5) 
11 JEBO 2016 Public only Conditional exit Health 25 (5) 
12 JEBO 2016 Conditional exit Public only Health 25 (5) 
13 May 2017 Public only Universal exit Health 25 (5) 
14 
 May 2017 Public only Universal exit Health 25 (5) 
Notes: The data analyzed are the data from rows 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13 and 14 (in bold font). This comprises 
data from 200 participants in 40 groups of 5 participants. 20 groups are run with the neutral context and 20 
groups are run with the health context. The 40 groups are independent of one another. Data from “JEBO 
2015” and “JEBO 2016” are from [1] and [2], respectively. The data from May 2017 were run to complete 
the experimental design and have not been published elsewhere. 
Each group remained together throughout the session so that the two groups 
in each session represented independent observations. Participants were told, at 
 
 
4Instructions used in the experiment can be found in [1] and [2]. As noted in footnotes 1 and 2, the 
data for the 20 groups with the neutral context and the data for the first 10 groups with the health 
context were collected and analyzed in [1] and [2]. This original sample size was inadequate for 
finding context effects in a public-only finance setting. Given the mean (and standard deviation) of 
the implemented tax rates in the neutral context of 55.24% (3.40%), the statistical power of finding a 
3-percentage point difference in contexts in this case was only 0.63 based on a two sample t-test of 
differences at a 5% significance level (see e.g. [11]). For the situation we are considering we do not 
believe that a difference of less than 3-percentage points is economically meaningful. To increase the 
statistical power of finding a context effect, should one exist, the sample size for the health context 
groups was increased by 10 additional groups in May 2017. With these additional groups there is 
now a statistical power of 0.80 of finding a 3-percentage point difference, signifying an 80% confi-
dence that our testing correctly rejects a null hypothesis of no context effect when the alternative 
hypothesis of a context effect is true. The statistical power increases to 0.96 in finding a context ef-
fect difference of 4-percentage points between tax rates should there be one. All of the data that is 
analyzed here includes 10 new health context groups and is analyzed differently than how the origi-
nal data were analyzed in [1] and [2]. 
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the beginning of each decision period, that each member of their group would 
randomly be assigned an income, expressed in laboratory dollars (L$), from the 
following set of five income levels (L$125, L$275, L$640, L$700, L$1500), and 
that each participant would be assigned each of the income levels twice over the 
course of the ten periods of the treatment. The income distribution was chosen 
to ensure that the median income was below the mean (consistent with the 
theoretical assumption needed to assure the median voter’s choice of public pro-
vision would be supported if there was a majority-rule vote on public-only ver-
sus private-only provision).5 To keep participants actively thinking about their  
decisions, incomes were assigned in a pre-determined pseudo-random order 
such that in each session participants experienced each of the five income levels 
in the first five periods and then again in the last five periods of the treatments in 
which they participated, but the income levels were experienced in a different 
order over each five period phase. Each of the five participants in a group was 
instructed to submit the tax rate that he or she prefers to have imposed on eve-
ryone in the group to finance the provision of the private good given that the 
median of the preferred tax rates would be selected and implemented. The im-
plemented tax rate determines the group’s contribution to public finance and the 
tax revenues are then divided equally amongst the 5 group members to provide 
consumption of the private good. The median voter is the voter whose submitted 
tax rate is the implemented tax rate. 
The average participant payoff was $23 including a $5 show-up fee for a 
20-period session. Sessions lasted approximately 70 minutes.6 Participants were 
randomly recruited from the undergraduate student population at McMaster 
University. Participants were individually paid their cash earnings in private. 
The experiment was conducted using z-Tree software [12] and the McMaster 
University Research Ethics Board approved the laboratory protocol. 
5. Experimental Results 
The first theoretical prediction, that preferred tax rates will fall as endowment 
increases, is evaluated using a linear regression in which context, endowment 
and whether or not the observations are from the second 5-period phase of the 
treatment are included as dummy variables. There are 2000 observations in total 
collected from 20 independent groups of five participants in the health context 
(over ten periods) and 20 independent groups of five participants in the neutral 
context (over ten decision periods). There are 1000 observations for periods 1 - 5 
and 1000 observations for periods 6 - 10. For the regression analysis data are 
clustered on group. Table 2 presents the mean actual values and predicted val-
ues of preferred tax rates by endowment, context and phase while Table 3 
 
 
5This distribution of income is roughly representative of the incomes at the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th 
and 90th percentiles in Canada in 2013. 
6None of the participants had prior experience with this environment. Each 10-period portion of a 
session would have taken perhaps 25 minutes to complete. The average payoff is about $9 for each 
10-period portion. 
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presents the regression results. 
The regression results indicate that the context effect on preferred tax rates is 
not statistically significant (p = 0.110). There is a very small, but statistically sig-
nificant, phase effect of about 1.37 percentage points (p = 0.018). Preferred tax 
rates are slightly greater across the last five periods of the treatment than across 
the first five periods. Finally, as endowment increases the preferred tax rates fall 
(each pairwise change is significant at a 1% level of significance or lower). This 
supports Theoretical Prediction 1.  
The second theoretical prediction, that the implemented tax rate will be the 
preferred rate of the individual with the median income (L$640), is evaluated 
using a probit regression model that regresses a binary variable identifying 
whether an observation was from the individual whose submitted tax rate is the 
implemented tax rate (i.e. the median voter) on explanatory variables indicating 
context, endowment and whether the observations are from the second 5-period 
phase of the session or not. The regression data are clustered on group. There 
are 400 tax rates determined by participants in the environments studied here 
(200 in each of the health and neutral context treatments). In 48 of these periods 
the median tax rate was the preferred tax rate of two people who submitted 
identical rates. In one period, the median tax rate was the preferred tax rate of 
four people. Therefore, our analysis proceeds with 451 contributors to the 400 
 
Table 2. Predicted tax rates (percentages) by endowment and mean actual tax rates (per-
centages) by context (health or neutral), endowment and phase (periods 1 - 5 or periods 6 - 
10). 
  Phase 1 (periods 1 - 5) Phase 2 (periods 6 - 10) 
Endowments Predicted Neutral Health Neutral Health 
125 93.7 79.73 73.75 82.99 78.17 
275 82.1 73.75 67.97 75.87 69.54 
640 56.4 53.41 52.08 54.09 51.13 
700 53.1 49.77 48.51 50.74 48.34 
1500 26.5 24.49 28.82 26.48 28.62 
 
Table 3. OLS regression for preferred tax rates. 
Variable Coefficient Robust standard error T-statistic P-value 
Constant: endowment 125 76.765 1.869 41.07 0.000 
Endowment 275 −6.878 0.888 −7.75 0.000 
Endowment 640 −25.983 1.098 −23.67 0.000 
Endowment 700 −29.320 1.423 −20.60 0.000 
Endowment 1500 −51.558 1.923 −26.81 0.000 
Context: neutral 2.439 1.491 1.64 0.110 
Phase: second half 1.369 0.555 2.47 0.018 
Notes: Errors are clustered by group. 
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tax rates implemented in the two contexts of this treatment. Because of this, the 
sum across endowments, of the probit estimates of the proportion of times that 
the implemented tax rate comes from an individual with one of the five endow-
ments, will exceed unity. In the health context the number of contributors to the 
200 tax rates for that context was 231. For the neutral context the number of 
contributors was 220. Table 4 presents the regression results and Figure 1 
presents the actual distributions of implemented tax rates by endowment of the 
individual whose submitted tax rate is the implemented tax rate by context and 
phase. 
From Figure 1 it is clear that Theoretical Prediction 2 is not supported by the 
data because individuals other than the individual with the endowment of L$640 
prefer the tax rate that is implemented. This may be a result of the choice of en-
dowments. The difference between the L$640 endowment of the median income 
 
Table 4. Probit regression identifying the endowment of individuals whose preferred tax 
rates are implemented. 
Variable Coefficient Robust standard error Z-statistic P-value 
Constant:  
endowment 125 −1.446 0.110 −13.19 0.000 
Endowment 275 0.037 0.128 0.29 0.773 
Endowment 640 1.541 0.148 10.40 0.000 
Endowment 700 1.269 0.137 9.26 0.000 
Endowment 1500 −0.060 0.136 −0.44 0.657 
Context: neutral −0.068 0.041 −1.67 0.095 
Phase: second half −0.033 0.029 −1.15 0.251 
Notes: Errors are clustered by group. 
 
 
Figure 1. Predicted and actual proportions of implemented tax rates by endowment of 
individuals whose preferred tax rates emerged as the implemented tax rates. 
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individual and the individual with the next highest endowment of L$700 is less 
than 10 percent of the median income. For each of the other “steps” in endow-
ments, the increases are far larger. The moves to L$275 from L$125, to L$640 
from L$275 and to L$1500 from L$700 are 120%, 133% and 114%. These are all 
very different from a 9% increase. Also, the predicted tax rates for individuals 
with endowments of L$125, L$275, L$640, L$700 and L$1500 are 93.7%, 82.1%, 
56.4%, 53.1% and 26.5%. Except for the change from L$640 to L$700 of 3 per-
centage points, the predicted drops in preferred tax rates as endowment falls ex-
ceeds 10 percentage points. From Figure 1 it is also clear that the preferred rates 
of the individuals with endowments of 640 and 700 are generally the imple-
mented tax rates. The preferred tax rate of one of these two individuals is im-
plemented in 87.75% of the 400 decisions rounds in which a tax rate was imple-
mented.7 While the data do not support Theoretical Prediction 2, there is sup-
port for a weaker version of Prediction 2 in which there is a large concentration  
of choices of the implemented tax rate associated with individuals with endow-
ments very close to L$640. 
The probit regression results support the conclusion that there is no phase ef-
fect associated with the determination of the implemented tax rate (p = 0.251) 
and that there is no context effect (p = 0.095). Individuals with endowments of 
L$125 are not expected to have their preferred tax rates implemented, but this 
happens about 8% of the time. Similarly, individuals with endowments of L$275 
and L$1500 are not expected to have their preferred tax rates implemented but 
their preferred tax rates are implemented about as often as those of the individu-
als with endowments of L$125. These account for a small but statistically signif-
icant number of times, and so while our results show general support for the 
median voter model, we cannot conclude for our environment that the median 
voter mechanism consistently implements tax rates preferred by only the voter 
with the median income endowment. With respect to a context effect, there is no 
evidence that context affects the likelihood that the implemented tax rate is the 
preferred tax rate of the participant with the median income endowment.  
Figure 2 presents the predicted implemented tax rate and the actual mean 
implemented tax rates by period for the neutral and health contexts. Each point 
in Figure 2 is the mean of the implemented tax rates from each of 20 groups for 
each context. We have 400 observations of implemented tax rates over 10 deci-
sion rounds from 40 groups of 5 participants. We analyze these data using an 
 
 
7In the periods for which there was more than one individual whose preferred tax rate was the im-
plemented tax rate there were 20 periods in which both the preferred tax rates of individuals with 
endowments of L$640 and L$700 were implemented. These occurred 11 times in the health context 
and 9 times in the neutral context. In the health context the preferred tax rates of the individuals 
with endowments of L$640 and L$700 were implemented 180 times. In the neutral context this 
number was 191 times. Because of the times that the preferred tax rates from individuals with both 
of these endowments were selected, we have to reduce the 180 and 191 numbers by 11 and 9 respec-
tively to obtain the number of times that either L$640 or L$700 was associated with the implemented 
tax rates. Accordingly, the proportion of times that the individual with the median endowment pre-
ferred the implemented tax rate was 84.5% (169/200) for the health context and 91% (182/200) for 
the neutral context. 
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Figure 2. Predicted and actual mean implemented tax rates by period and 
context. 
 
OLS regression clustered on group. The dependent variables are the context 
(health or neutral) and the phase (the first five periods or the second five pe-
riods). The regression results are presented in Table 5. 
The data indicate that implemented tax rates are greater in the neutral context 
than in the health context and that there is a small increase in the implemented 
tax rates for both contexts between the first and second phases (see the loga-
rithmic trend lines in Figure 2). However, the regression results indicate that 
these differences are not statistically significant. 
Table 6 presents the predicted and mean actual implemented tax rates, the 
predicted and mean actual total public provisions of good h and the predicted 
and mean actual total system payoffs by neutral and health contexts. The data 
presented in Table 6 are from the last 5-period phase of the health and neutral 
context treatments. To obtain these values we compute the mean value of each 
variable for each group over the second phase of the public-only treatment. We 
then calculate the mean of the 20 group means by context. We have selected this 
phase for the presentation of results for implemented tax rates, for consumption 
and for system payoffs because the data indicate slightly higher preferred tax 
rates and implemented tax rates in the latter periods of the treatment. We in-
terpret this as an effect associated with learning about the environment and is 
essentially an outcome of the repeated game. 
The only variable collected directly from the participants in the laboratory 
sessions is the preferred tax rate. The median of the preferred tax rates submitted 
by all participants in the group is chosen as the implemented tax rate for the pe-
riod. It is the implemented tax rate that determines the public provision of good 
h consumed by each participant in a group and the amount of good c that is 
purchased privately. Because the environment does not permit participants to 
save for future consumption, whatever portion of each participant’s endowment 
not taken by the proportional tax selected by the median voter to provide good h 
is automatically directed towards the individual’s private purchase of good c. 
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Table 5. OLS regression for implemented tax rates. 
Variable Coefficient Robust standard error T-statistic P-value 
Constant: health  
context 52.04 1.4703 35.39 0.000 
Context: neutral 2.73 1.6655 1.64 0.109 
Phase: second half 0.68 0.6941 0.98 0.333 
Notes: Errors are clustered by group. 
 
Table 6. Mean per period implemented tax rate, total public provision and aggregate 
payoffs. 
 Predicted 
Neutral  
context 
(St. Dev.) 
Health  
context 
(st. Dev.) 
Test of difference across 
contexts 
P-value 
(t-test) 
P-value 
(MWU-test) 
Implemented tax 
rate 56.4 
55.24 
(3.18) 
[0.12] 
52.92 
(6.40) 
[0.03] 
0.15 0.22 
Total public  
consumption 1827 
1789.78 
(102.94) 
[0.12] 
1714.61 
(207.44) 
[0.03] 
0.12 0.21 
Aggregate  
payoffs 6550 
6535.30 
(17.46) 
[0.00] 
6520.05 
(69.22) 
[0.07] 
0.35 1.00 
Observations  20 20   
Notes: The observations are the mean implemented tax rates, mean total public provision and mean aggre-
gate payoffs over periods 6 through 10 for each group. The values in square brackets are p-values associated 
with a two-sided test of the null that there is no difference between the predicted and actual implemented 
tax rate. 
 
Whether there is a context effect on consumption of goods h and c and the total 
payoffs to participants will be determined by the tax rate that is implemented.  
The statistics in Table 6 indicate that the mean implemented tax rate in the 
neutral context is 55.24%. This is not different from the predicted value (p = 
0.12). In the health context the implemented tax rate is 52.92%. This is different 
from the predicted value (p = 0.03). However, the difference between the two 
mean implemented tax rates under each context is only 2.32%. The magnitude of 
this difference is small and the difference is not statistically significant. We can-
not reject the null hypothesis that the means are equal in favor of the alternative 
that the implemented tax rate in the health context is statistically significantly 
different from the implemented tax rate in the neutral context (t-test, p = 0.15; 
Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.22). On this basis, we conclude that our data do not 
support a context effect. 
Given that the difference between the mean implemented tax rates for the two 
contexts is not economically meaningful and that the system consumption of 
good h data and implemented tax rate data are perfectly correlated, the test re-
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sult reported above will support the conclusion that there is no significant dif-
ference between system consumption in the two contexts. System payoffs for the 
two contexts are 0.2% lower with the health context than with the neutral con-
text. This difference for system payoffs is not statistically significant (t-test, p = 
0.35; Mann-Whitney test, p = 1.00). There is no context effect associated with 
the implemented tax rates, the consumption of the publicly provided private 
good or the system payoffs. 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
We present data from controlled laboratory sessions in which individuals report 
their preferred tax rates for collecting resources to publicly finance the provision 
of a private good. The tax rate that is implemented is the preferred rate of the 
median voter. With respect to the theoretical predictions related to the imple-
mentation of a median voter mechanism in a laboratory environment, we find 
that preferred tax rates fall as endowments rise and that the preferred tax rates of 
voters with endowments at or within 10% of the median endowment select the 
median tax rate in nearly 90% of our 400 observations. This generally provides 
support for the median voter model. 
The conjecture that we may find a different tax rate implemented if the private 
good which is publicly provided is identified specifically as a health care good is 
not supported by the data. This is contrary to what might arise if the health con-
text evoked a merit-good effect that leads to higher taxes directed to the public 
provision of the merit good. Accordingly, we find that context does not affect 
the public provision of the private good or the total group payoff. 
As noted earlier, previous studies have found context effects associated with 
health versus non-health environments with respect to the influence of profes-
sional norms on physician decision-making and the decisions individuals make 
in a controlled laboratory environment regarding the purchase of private health 
care insurance that permits “queue jumping” for health care services. These are 
decision settings different than that we investigate. This difference may account 
for our different results. It is possible that participants recognized that although 
we identified the publicly provided private good as health care, they also recog-
nized the redistribution effect of the median voter mechanism used to finance 
this public provision. Accordingly, any preference individuals may have had for 
contributing to the provision of a merit good may have been satisfied through 
their required participation in this financing mechanism. 
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